




Decentralization, Interdependence and Performance Measurement System Design
Abernethy, M.; Bouwens, J.F.M.G.; van Lent, L.A.G.M.
Publication date:
2001
Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Abernethy, M., Bouwens, J. F. M. G., & van Lent, L. A. G. M. (2001). Decentralization, Interdependence and
Performance Measurement System Design: Sequences and Priorities. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2001-
28). Accounting.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 12. May. 2021
No. 2001-28
DECENTRALIZATION, INTERDEPENDENCE AND
PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT SYSTEM DESIGN:
SEQUENCES AND PRIORITIES




Decentralization, Interdependence and Performance
Measurement System Design: Sequences and Priorities*
Margaret  A. Abernethy

















Keywords: Subunit performance measurement, interdependencies, specific knowledge,
organizational design
JEL classification: D23; L22; M12; M4
                                                          
•  This study was supported by grants from the NIVRA and the Australian Research Council.  We thank Peter
Easton, Chris Ittner, David Otley, Frank Selto and workshop participants at the University of Melbourne,
Nyenrode University and Tilburg University for helpful comments.
09.04.01
2
Decentralization, interdependence and performance measurement system design:
Sequences and priorities
Abstract
We investigate the determinants of decentralization and performance measurement choices in
multidivisional firms.  We extend the research on the economics of organizational design
choices by examining the impact of two important determinants of those choices, namely,
subunit interdependencies and knowledge transfer costs. We test our predictions with a
simultaneous equation model that captures the endogenous choices relating to the level of
decentralization and the use of alternative subunit performance measures using data collected
from 78 business units.  Our findings are generally consistent with our predictions.
1
1.  Introduction
This study examines empirically two determinants identified as important to organization
design choices, namely, subunit interdependencies and knowledge transfer costs (Keating,
1997; Nagar, 1999 a, b).  We assess the impact of these factors on choices relating to
decentralization and performance metrics using a model that allows for these choices to be
made simultaneously.  Despite strong theoretical support for the idea that designing elements
of an organization control system to “fit” or complement each other (Jensen and Meckling,
1992; Milgrom and Roberts, 1995), our understanding of these design choices remains
limited.
Our study is based on the analytical frameworks developed by Jensen and Meckling
(1992) and Milgrom and Roberts (1995).  The model assesses choices relating to level of
decentralization and two forms of subunit performance metrics, namely, aggregated
performance measures (eg. profit or ROI) and disaggregated performance measures or what
we refer to as specific performance measures (e.g. production expenditure, R&D, sales
revenues).  The simultaneous equation model can be summarized as follows:
Decentralization = function (aggregated PMs, specific PMs, subunit interdependence,
knowledge transfer costs).
Aggregated PMs = function (decentralization, specific PMs, subunit interdependence,
knowledge transfer costs).
Specific PMs = function (decentralization, aggregated PMs, subunit interdependence,
knowledge transfer costs).
We test our model using data obtained from a survey of 78 divisional managers of Dutch
firms.  Our results are generally supportive of our expectations.  We find that decentralization
is positively and significantly related to knowledge transfer costs and negatively related to
levels of subunit interdependencies.  The use of aggregated PMs is significantly related to
subunit interdependencies.  However, the significance and direction of the relation depends on
the nature of the interdependencies.  When the actions of divisional managers influence the
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performance of other divisions the relationship is negative but not significant.  However, we
found that the use of aggregated PMs increases when the divisional manager’s own
performance is influenced by actions of other divisional managers.  Only knowledge transfer
costs and the level of decentralization influenced the use of specific PMs.
The study contributes to the empirical literature on the economics of organization design
(Bushman et al., 1995), Keating, 1997; Nagar, 1999a, 1999b) through extension and synthesis
of prior models.  We extend the Bushman et al. (1995) and Keating (1997) models by
examining choices between use of own-level aggregated performance measures and the use of
more disaggregated performance measures.  We also include two elements of organization
design, namely structure and PMSs.  This enables an integration of the Nagar (1999a) and
Keating (1997) models.  Our model further integrates the literature by including the
interdependence variable identified as important by Keating (1997) and Bushman et al. (1995)
and the “cost of transferring knowledge” variable important in Nagar’s models.
The paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 develops the hypotheses.  This is followed
by a description of the method and the results.  The final section provides some concluding
comments and directions for further research.
2. Theoretical Framework
Theory and earlier evidence suggest that decisions relating to decentralization and
PMS choices are made simultaneously and that these choices are influenced by a number of
exogenous factors.  The impact of interdependencies among subunits and cost of transferring
knowledge on these choices is discussed in turn.
2.1 Interdependencies.
Interdependencies among organizational subunits vary along a continuum.  At one end
of the continuum subunits operate autonomously where the only form of interdependence is
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with corporate services, to the other end where subunits have reciprocal interdependencies.
This is where subunits are required to trade their intermediate products with each other
(Thompson, 1967).  In other words, the demand functions of the subunits firm may be
dependent or they may have joint supply and cost functions  (see Milgrom and Roberts, 1992,
p. 108-109, 113-116).  The operating externalities created by such dependencies directly
influence top management’s decision to delegate decision rights. The existence of operating
externalities implies that there are benefits to be gained by co-ordinating the activities of the
subunits. When local managers are delegated decision rights they will optimize their own
subunit’s profit rather than consider the impact of their decisions on other units. Hence,
ceteris paribus, the cost associated with decentralization will increase as operating
dependencies increase.  Top management will attempt to minimize the opportunity for sub-
optimal decision making by centralizing decision making (Christie et al., 1993). In other
words, centralization will be the least cost option when interdependencies are high.
Interdependencies will also significantly influence the design and use of PMSs.
However, the impact of interdependencies on the use of PMSs is not due to the effect of
operating externalities, as such.  Rather, it is the influence that interdependencies have on the
behaviour of subunit managers when performance is measured based on metrics that are
influenced by actions of other subunits.  While some attention has been devoted to this issue
(Hayes, 1976; Bouwens and Abernethy, 2000; Christie et al., 1993; Gordon and Narayanan,
1984), Keating (1997) and Bushman et al. (1995) were among the first to provide empirical
evidence on how interdependencies influence top management’s choice of performance
metric.  They argued that firm level profit would be superior to the subunit profit measure due
to the “noise” created by the activities performed in other subunits.  Not only does the subunit
profit measure become less informative in assessing managerial performance, superiors will
also use firm profit to encourage subunit managers to co-operate.  In contrast, when
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interdependencies are low, subunit profit will become increasingly important.  In this setting,
it is superior to the firm income as it captures the outcome associated with activities
performed only within that subunit.
Based on prior literature, we would thus expect that subunit performance measures
would become less important as interdependencies increase.  This is expected to be the case
with both types of subunit measures – aggregated profit measures as well as specific measures
relating to production efficiency, R&D costs and quality.1  Specific measures are also
influenced by actions taken in interdependent subunits and thus will be less informative about
the actions of individual subunit managers.  In sum, we expect a negative relation between
subunit interdependencies and both components of the subunit PMS.
2.2 Knowledge Transfer Costs.
There is some ambiguity in how Nagar (1999a and 1999b) and Christie et al. (1993)
define knowledge transfer costs.  The variable appears to have two dimensions: one capturing
specific knowledge (i.e. knowledge impacted at the subunit level) and a second capturing
environmental factors (i.e. competition, strategy, size, growth).  While it is possible that the
two dimensions are correlated, our model is developed to enable a more careful exposition of
the relation among these two dimensions and organization design choices.
2.2.1 Specific Knowledge.
Specific knowledge is information that is impacted at the subunit level.  It occurs due
to the costs of transferring information to higher levels in the hierarchy. Subordinate
managers obtain specific knowledge relating to markets, technology, suppliers and other
factors relating to their external environment.  The level of specific knowledge increases as
                                                          
1It is possible that a firm could select performance measures that did not include any “noise”.  However, the way
in which the construct is defined in this study does not enable us to make that assumption.
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the complexity associated with these factors increases.  As complexity increases it becomes
more costly to transfer the information required for decision making upwards in the
organization.  These costs relate not only to the systems required to transmit the information
effectively but also the costs of sub-optimal decision making when the cognitive limitations
of top management preclude the efficient processing of information.  Thus, as the level of
specific knowledge increases it comes less costly to decentralize than to invest in processes
and systems to increase the information processing capabilities of a centralized management
structure.
Specific knowledge also influences the reliance and choice of performance measures.
Increasing levels of SK at the subunit level limits the ability of the principal to assess whether
agents are operating in the firm’s best interests.  When top management cannot observe agent
decisions they will attempt to alleviate or at least minimize the potential for opportunistic
behavior by implementing performance measurement systems that capture the output of
agent’s decisions.  The delegation of decision rights which follows from the presence of
specific knowledge will prompt supervisors to rely on aggregate performance measures to
encourage subunit managers to optimally use the specific knowledge.  This would imply an
increase of aggregate measure use.  There are, however, factors that will mitigate this effect.
The presence of specific knowledge also enables subunit managers to manipulate these
measures and thus superiors may be reluctant to rely on them for performance evaluation.  It
is also argued that aggregate measures are often too late (i.e. insensitive to decisions) and/or
too crude (not accurate) to assess the effect of managerial decisions (e.g., Kaplan and
Atkinson, 1997; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992).  After controlling for decentralization, there
may be little additional benefit in using these measures as they will insufficiently convey the
effect of managerial decisions.  This implies that the use of aggregate measure will decrease
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when specific knowledge increases. It is, therefore, expected that specific knowledge has a
negative effect on the use of aggregate performance measures.
We do, however, expect a positive and significant relation between SK and the use of
specific performance measures.  In the presence of SK specific measures can be informative
about pivotal activities within the subunit. According to Holmstrom (1979) principals will use
additional performance measures only when these measures reveal new information about
agent’s actions at low cost (i.e. marginal benefit > marginal cost).  Compared with aggregated
measures, specific measures are designed to  provide incremental information on the
subordinate’s performance with respect to the pivotal activities. To the subordinate including
specific measures decreases the risk that his contribution is insufficiently captured by the
performance measurement system.  After controlling for decentralization we, therefore,
expect the relation between specific knowledge and specific measures to be positive.
2.2.2 Environmental Conditions
Based on prior research (Christie et al., 1993) we incorporate three variables to capture
the knowledge transfer costs associated with environmental factors: growth opportunities,
competition and size.  Nagar (1999a,b) and Keating (1997) both incorporated growth
opportunities and size into their models.  We include competition as it has been recognized as
a critical factor influencing organizational design choices (Khandwalla, 1972; Christie et al.
1993).  It is also conceptually similar to the strategy variable used by Nagar (1999a) and the
product heterogeneity construct developed by Christie et al. (1993).  We expect environment
factors to have differential effects on design choices.  Our expectations with respect to these
relations are developed in turn.
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2.2.2.1  Impact on Decentralization
The ability of top management to effectively “micro manage” at the subunit level
becomes increasingly difficult in firms pursuing a growth strategy.  The delegation of
decision rights enables subunit managers to scan the environment for new opportunities and
threats and respond accordingly.  Similar arguments apply for firms pursuing strategies that
involve high levels of competition.  To be successful in a highly competitive environment
requires a decision making structure that is flexible, dynamic and adaptable (Khandwalla,
1972).  This requires a decentralized structure where subunit managers have the authority to
respond quickly to changes in competitive conditions.  Size is also an important determinant
of decentralization.  The sheer volume of information required to manage large organizations
makes it impossible or prohibitively costly for decision making to be centralized.  The
inefficiencies associated with large bureaucratic organizations with centralized decision
making structures have long been recognized (Bolton and Dewatripont, 1995; Vancil 1978;
Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967).  In sum, ceteris paribus, decentralization will be the least cost
solution in firms that are large, pursuing a high growth strategy and facing intense
competition.  We, therefore, expect a positive relation between decentralization and growth,
size and competition.
2.2.2.2  Impact on Choice of Performance Metric
There is no reason to expect a separate effect of growth or size on choice of
performance metric other than through the creation of specific knowledge.  For the same
reasons as argued in relation to the SK variable, growth and size create the opportunity for the
development of specialized knowledge at the subunit level and possibility for moral hazard
problems to arise.  Thus, the choice of performance metrics will be due to the development of
specialized knowledge and top management’s attempt to minimize opportunistic behaviour,
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rather than any direct effect of growth or size on PMS design.  On the other hand, prior
literature suggests that competition may in fact directly influence the relative importance
placed on performance measures by top management.  Khandwalla (1972) is one of the few
researchers that have provided evidence on the relation between competition and use of
management accounting systems.  His findings provide support for the idea that top
management’s use of accounting performance measures will intensify when competition
increases.  There is no theoretical reason for expecting that the choice of performance
measure (aggregated or specific) will differ dependent on level of competition.
2.3 Summary of Expectations
Table 1 and the following hypotheses summarizes the above discussion:
H1: The level of decentralization decreases as the subunit operating interdependencies
increase and increases as the level of subunit specific knowledge, subunit growth
opportunities, size and competition increases.
H2: The use of aggregated subunit performance measures decreases when subunit
interdependencies increase and increases when competition intensifies.
H3: The use of specific subunit performance measures decreases as subunit
interdependencies increase and increases as subunit specific knowledge increases and
competition intensifies.
Insert Table 1 here
3. Method
Our sample included corporations listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. We
needed firms with more than one division to investigate the hypothesized relation between
performance measures and intra-firm dependencies and thus we included only those firms
with at least two operating divisions.  Divisions were defined as subunits that report directly
to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or Chief Operating Officer (COO) of the firm.  Our first
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contact was with the chief financial officer (CFO).  We asked the CFO to introduce us to
divisional managers within the firm.  This resulted in 78 divisions representing 15 industries. 2  
In most of the cases, one of the researchers visited the divisional manager on site.  This
intensive approach increased the support provided by those agreeing to participate and also
enabled us to capture qualitative data concerning more general issues relating to organization
design.  It also provided face validity for the constructs of interest in this study
3.1 Measurement of variables
The measurement of each variable is discussed in turn.  The survey instruments used
are reproduced in Appendix A.   Summary statistics for each variable are presented in Table
2.
Insert Table 2 here
3.1.1 Endogenous variables
3.1.1.1 Level of decentralization.
We measure the level of decentralization using an adapted version of the Gordon and
Narayanan (1984) instrument.  We include only those items that relate to the degree to which
decision rights are assigned to lower level managers.  We asked managers to indicate their
influence over a range of decisions (e.g. strategic, human resource management, operational,
investment and marketing decisions).  The measure (DECEN) was obtained by averaging the
responses to five survey items.  Factor analysis and reliability assessment of the five items
supported this approach (see Table 3).  Performance measurement system design.
We are specifically interested in the use of subunit aggregated and specific measures.
We use Keating’s (1997) notion of own-level measures (subunit income or ROI measures) to
capture the use of aggregated measures.  Aggregated measures (AGG) such as profit or ROI
                                                          
2 We did not expect “industry” to be a significant predictor of organization design and thus selected a wide
variety of industries to increase the generalizability of the findings.  Our analysis supports this expectation.
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summarize subunit performance in one measure.  We asked respondents to assign weights to
the relative importance of AGG measures3 vis a vis other performance metrics.4
A separate instrument was used to capture the use of specific performance metrics to
circumvent a forced dependence between the two performance measurement constructs.  The
specific measure variable (SPEC) summed the weights on the two items that capture the use
of measures that inform on specific functions (e.g. expenditure and revenue data relating to
R&D, marketing, etc.) within the business unit.
3.1.2 Exogenous variables
3.1.2.1 Interdependencies.
To test the relative importance of the two performance metrics we measured
interdependence based on the Keating (1997) instrument.  The first item asked respondents to
identify the extent to which their activities impacted other subunits (IMPACT1), and the
second item asked the extent to which their performance was affected by the activities carried
out by other subunits (IMPACT2).  To be consistent with Keating (1997) we treated each item
as a separate measure.
To test the impact of interdependencies on decentralization we used an alternative
measure.5  This measure focuses on the exchange of goods and services between subunits
within the firm.  The items were purpose-developed to capture operating externalities caused
by joint cost and supply functions or dependent demand functions.  We asked subunit
managers two questions: (1) percentage of incoming supply of goods or service sourced from
other subunits in percentage of the total incoming supply of goods, and (2) the percentage of
                                                          
3 The Likert type scales Keating and others are problematic in that they allow respondents to answer that all
performance measures are important.  We wanted respondents to reveal the relative use of performance
measures.
4 A similar approach to create a continuous scale has been successfully used by Govindarajan and Gupta (1984).
5  Using two separate measures for interdependence helped to identify  the simultaneous equations model.  There
are also substantive reasons for operationalizing this construct differently.  In the case of decentralization we are
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total outgoing goods provided to other subunits.  The variable SUPPLY is the sum of these
two percentages.
3.1.2.2 Knowledge Transfer Costs.
Specific Knowledge.  Using the six-item scale developed by Dunk (1993), we asked
managers to rate their knowledge relative to their superior’s in their area of responsibility.
The results of the factor analysis (see Table 3) indicated that there was only one common
factor.  Scale reliability was well above conventional levels (Nunnally, 1951). These results
are consistent with Dunk (1993). We summed the scores on the six items to obtain a measure
for specific knowledge (SK).
Environmental Conditions.  We capture three elements of the environment in which
the firm operates, namely, growth opportunities, size and competition.  We developed an
instrument to measure growth opportunities. The instrument asks managers to rate growth
expectations for (1) their own subunit and for (2) the industry in which the subunit operates.
The two-item measure allowed for a validation test between the items. We evaluated scale
reliability with Cronbach’s alpha. The estimated coefficient was 0.77, which is beyond
conventional levels.  We defined SIZE as the number of employees working in a unit.  We
measured competition using items introduced into the literature by Khandwalla (1972).  This
instrument comprises different elements of competition, namely, price, promotion and
distribution, product quality, and product variety.  We tested whether the construct (COMP)
instrument was unidimensional using factor analysis and the results indicate that the four
items represent one construct (see Table 3).  The alpha reliability of the four items (0.65) also
supported the use of a summed measure.
                                                                                                                                                                                    
interested in the jointness of the supply and demand functions while for the PMS constructs we are interested in
the way in which managerial actions in relation to other subunits influence the use of performance measures.
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3.1.3 Control Variables
Prior literature suggested that we include the following three control variables in our
model: (1) subunit performance (Ittner & Larcker, 2000);  (2) relative size as a proxy for
subunit risk differences (Fama and French, 1993; Kothari et al., 1995) and (3) the intensity of
the performance measure as a proxy for the sensitivity and precision of the measure (Banker
and Datar, 1989).  While we are not interested in the impact of these variables on our
dependent variables, their inclusion minimizes the possibility of omitted variable bias.
In order for our model to be identified we used two separate measures, past
performance (PPERF) and current performance (CPERF). The two constructs are highly
correlated supporting the validity of our approach.  We measure performance by asking
managers to rate how their subunit performs relatively to competitors, and relatively to what
is expected by their superiors.  We assessed scale reliability with Cronbach’s alpha.
Coefficient estimates are 0.59 (CPERF) and 0.68 (PPERF).  Relative size was measured as
the percentage of sales of the subunit to the total firm or the total of the assets as a percentage
to total firm assets.  Intensity was captured by asking respondents how well the two
performance measures captured the subunit’s effort (see Appendix A, 8(iii) and 8(iv)).
We also defined four dummy variables to capture potential industry effects.
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
4. Results and Discussion
4.1 Correlation analysis
Table 4 presents Pearson and Spearman correlations among all the variables.  It
appears from Table 4, that decentralization is indeed related to interdependencies (SUPPLY
and IMPACT2), specific knowledge (SK), growth opportunities (GROWTH), and SIZE in the
way that was predicted.  Decentralization is also positively associated with the use of
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aggregated measures and negatively associated with specific measures.  Consistent with our
expectation we find a negative relation between use of aggregated performance measures
(AGG) and interdependencies (IMPACT1).  The results relating to the specific performance
measure variable (SPEC) do not support our expectations.  There appears to be no correlation
between interdependencies and SPEC and a negative relation between SPEC and specific
knowledge.  There appears to be no relation between the three choice variables and level of
competition (COMP).
4.2 Test of the Model
We use three simultaneous equations to test our model.  These equations capture (1)
the degree of decentralization, (2) the use aggregated performance measures and (3) the use of
specific performance measures and are expressed as follows:
where all variables are as defined before.
DECEN, AGG and SPEC are the jointly determined endogenous variables and we
need to use all three structural equations to adequately describe the observed values.  The
complication in estimating this system is that ordinary least squares is inconsistent when the
disturbances are correlated with the explanatory variables.  To solve this problem researchers
routinely use ‘instrumental’ variables that are uncorrelated by assumption with the
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and we use this method to estimate the system. Monte Carlo studies have shown 2SLS to have
small-sample properties superior on most criteria to all other estimators. 2SLS is also robust
in the presence of multicollinearity and specification errors (Kennedy, 1996).  The asymptotic
standard errors are, however, unreliable in finite samples.  Usually asymptotic standard errors
underestimate the true variances.  We therefore use a bootstrapping method within the
simultaneous equation framework.6 Jeong and Maddala (1993) discuss a bootstrapping
approach in which any relation in the original data between instruments and disturbances is
preserved while resampling (see also, Freedman, 1984).7  The estimation results based on a
Jeong/Maddala-type bootstrapping approach with 2000 replications are in Table 5.  Jeong and
Maddala (1993) note that bootstrap standard errors are “useless” to test hypotheses.  They
suggest using the bootstrap method directly to construct confidence interval.  We conduct our
testing accordingly and use the empirical distribution of the parameter estimates to bootstrap
confidence intervals.8
Insert Table 5 here
The F-statistics show that the three equations are significant at the one per cent, five
per cent and 10 per cent level respectively.  The adjusted R2 for the decentralization
regression is 43.39 per cent providing strong support for the explanatory ability of the
                                                          
6 An earlier example of bootstrapping within a simultaneous equation framework in accounting research is in
Deis and Hill (1998).
7 Recall that the endogeneity of the PMS and organizational design variables was our reason to use 2SLS in the
first place. We proceeded as follows. First we estimated the model by 2SLS and computed the estimated residual
and the predicted instruments for each equation. We then resampled the data for the original instrument, the
estimated residual and the predicted instruments. We used the original instruments and the estimated residual to
compute a value for the dependent variable. Finally, we computed the bootstrap estimates of the parameters by
using the computed value of the dependent variable, the predicted instruments and the original instruments.
8 Jeong and Maddala (1993) recommend using a large number of replications (between 1000 and 2000) for the
computation of stable confidence intervals, we use 2000 replications.  The empirical distribution should not be
skewed, but be close to normal. We test the normality assumption for the empirical distribution of all the
parameter estimates using a Shapiro-Wilk statistic. The results (not reported) indicate that the null hypothesis of
a normal distribution cannot be rejected, except in three cases: SPEC_P and COMP in equation 2 and
INT_SPEC in equation 3. Since two of these instances involve control variables (COMP and INT_SPEC) we are
not overly concerned with the effects on our study.
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independent variables.9  We also report the original 2SLS results for comparison (Appendix
B).
As expected, top management are likely to assign more decision rights to subunits
where managers have a high level of specific knowledge (coefficient = 0.10, p-value <0.01).
This finding is consistent with the idea that specific knowledge at the local level increases the
efficiency of decentralized decision making compared to a centralized decision making
structure.  We also find evidence that the environmental conditions that represent dimensions
of knowledge transfer costs were significant in explaining the extent to which decision rights
are delegated.  Both growth opportunities (GROWTH) and SIZE are positively related to
decentralization (coefficient = 0.28, and 0.17 respectively, both p-value <0.05).  We also find
support for our prediction relating to interdependencies and decentralization.  We argued that
interdependencies between subunits raise the coordination cost of decentralization.  Local
managers are more likely to make locally-optimal decision, ignoring the impact of their
decisions on other units.  To ensure globally-optimal results, higher manager may be forced to
retain certain decision rights. We find that interdependencies between subunits (SUPPLY) are
negatively correlated with the level of decentralization in a firm (coefficient = -0.01, p-value
<0.05).   It was surprising to find no evidence that decentralization choice and PMS design are
associated. Both AGG_P and SPEC_P are insignificant.
The adjusted R2 for the equation relating to the use of aggregate performance
measures (Equation 2) indicated that the model has some explanatory ability (i.e. 12.76 per
cent).  Our expectations are only partially supported.  We find an unexpected and significantly
positive relation between the impact of other subunits on the performance of the subunit
(coefficient = 5.21, p-value <0.10) and the use of aggregated own level performance
                                                          
9 Although there is some evidence of multicollinearity in all equations, we are not too concerned about its
effects. In Table 7, OLS is still a consistent estimator in the presence of collinearity. What’s more, we are able to
obtain significance for the variables of interest and therefore we follow Kennedy’s (1996) recommendation to do
nothing about potential collinearity.
16
measures.  In other words, the greater that the activities of A influence the performance of B,
the more B’s performance will be measured based on their own profit.  This finding is
counter-intuitive and at first appears contrary to the notion of informativeness.10  However,
given the top management are aware of the interdependencies existing among subunits, the
use of aggregate profit measures has information content about how well a manager is
anticipating the effects of other subunit activities on their own activities.  While the manager
cannot control the activities of the other subunits, they can affect changes in their own subunit
by adjusting their own costs, product mix, etc. As Keating (1997) argued in relation to the use
of stock price, it may be suboptimal to insulate managers from the effects of what appears to
be uncontrollable factors. Merchant (1987, p. 332) argued that inclusion of non-controllable
factors in the performance measurement system draw the manager’s attention to those issues
that are initially beyond his control.  This suggests that performance measures that include
non-controllable factors will still be informative on the amount of effort the manager puts in
to increase ‘controllability’ of these factors.  There were no significant relations with the other
two endogenous variables (DECEN_P and SPEC_P).
The specific measure regression, Equation 3, also provides some explanatory power
with 11.96 per cent of the variance explained.  As predicted, specific knowledge is associated
with use of specific measures (coefficient = 2.09, p-value < 0.05).  Top management use of
specific measures increases with greater level of specific knowledge, which suggests positive
payoffs to using these measures.11  There is, however, no association between
interdependencies and the use of specific measures.
The significant association between choice of organization design and the use of
specific measures is a core result of our paper.  If more decision rights are assigned to local
                                                          
10 In literature, ‘informativeness’ and ‘conditional controllability’ are used interchangeably (Bushman et al.,
1995).
11 Note that the observed correlation (Table 4) between specific measures and specific knowledge if negative.
However, after controlling for the other variables in Equation 3, the relation appears to be positive.
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managers, higher-level managers use specific performance measures less (coefficient on
DECEN_P = -17.93, p-value <0.01).  The direction of this relation is difficult to explain as
conventional wisdom would lead us to expect that decentralization goes together with
investment in more sophisticated performance measurement systems (Kaplan and Atkinson,
1997; Horngren et al., 1999).  Recent work in information economics (Bolton and
Dewatripont, 1995), however, suggests that the implementation of more sophisticated PMSs
may not be effective.  It is argued that such systems would further exacerbate the problem
associated with information overload.  Recall that top management decentralize to facilitate
greater information processing capacity at lower levels of management.  Implementation of
additional performance measures would increase the amount of information needed to be
processed by top management and may be counter-productive to the benefits of
decentralization.  Alternatively, when firms invest in sophisticated systems top management
becomes better informed and are thus able to centralize decision making.  In other words,
firms will not choose to decentralize and to invest in more sophisticated PMSs.  There are
costs associated with both these design choices and management will make a trade-off
dependent on the relative cost of each.12  This would suggest that these choices are substitutes
rather than complements.13
Taken together, the results from the simultaneous equation model suggest that
organizational structural decisions and PMS design choices are made sequentially rather than
simultaneously.  A sequence in structuring organizations means that managers assign decision
rights first and only then fit a PMS conditional upon their choice of decision right allocation.
Such a sequence would imply that PMS choices do not explain the level of decentralization
                                                          
12 The relative cost will be influenced by the presence of other exogenous variables.  In this case it would appear
to be the level of specific knowledge impacted at the subunit level.
13 The use of specific measures is also affected by the current performance of the unit. If a unit’s performance is
lagging (CPERF), higher-level managers will increase the use of specific measures (coefficient = -4.11, p-value
< 10%).  This is consistent with earlier evidence that a firm’s PMS depends on how successful the firm currently
is (Ittner and Larcker, 1999).
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and at the same time that decentralization explains the use of aggregate and specific measures.
Our results indicate that environmental conditions and specific knowledge explain
decentralization choices, but this choice is not influenced by performance measurement
choices.  The use of aggregated performance measures is also not influenced by decisions
relating to decentralization.  In contrast, decentralization is an important determinant of the
use of specific performance measures.  Prior studies have found similar results. For example,
Nagar (1999b) investigates the simultaneous choice between incentive systems and
decentralization and shows that while the incentive system is affected by the degree of
decentralization, the latter is not associated with the choice of incentive system.  Similarly,
evidence from the field suggests that firms are more concerned with getting their structure
“right” and then designing their PMS to meet the requirements of the structural arrangements
(Abernethy and Lillis, 1995).
4.3  Additional Analysis
The use of a 2SLS approach is motivated by arguments relating to the endogeneity of
organization and PMS design choices. Nevertheless, the extent to which endogeneity affects
the estimation of the equations is an empirical matter.  If there were no interaction between
the three equations, OLS and 2SLS estimation would both be consistent, but OLS would be
more efficient. We estimate our model again using OLS and report the results in Table 6.
The findings of the OLS model are valid only if OLS coefficient estimates do not suffer from
simultaneous equation estimate bias.  We test whether endogeneity is causing the OLS
estimates to be inconsistent using a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (MacKinnon, 1992).  We find
that OLS estimates are unbiased in Equations 1 and 2, (F-statistics = 0.90, 0.03; p= 0.41,
p=0.97).  However, the estimates are biased in Equation 3 (F-statistic = 4.17, p= 0.02). We
can therefore use the OLS results of Equations 1 and 2, but not those of Equation 3.
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Insert Table 6 here
The OLS results relating to the exogenous variables are qualitatively similar to those
reported using 2SLS.14  There are, however, clear differences between OLS and 2SLS
estimation of the endogenous variables (i.e. choice variables).  Under OLS estimation, the
PMS design variables (AGG and SPEC) are both significant in the decentralization regression
(coefficient = 0.01, t-statistic = 1.82 and coefficient = -0.01, t-statistic = -1.74).  In Equation
2, the OLS results suggest that DECEN is associated with the use of own-level aggregated
measures (coefficient = 8.50, t-statistic = 2.42).   While difficult to interpret, the use of
specific measures is also negative associated with level of decentralization.  This is consistent
with the 2SLS result.  The OLS results thus provide some evidence (albeit) weak that
decentralization is affected by choices in performance measurement.  The use of aggregate
measures is associated with higher levels of decentralization while the use of specific
measures is associated with increased centralization.  In turn, decentralization explains the use
of aggregated and specific measures in the presence of interdependencies and specific
knowledge.
5. Concluding Comments and Caveats
Our findings partly support our expectations in relation to the determinants of
organizational design.  We find strong evidence for the importance of knowledge transfer
costs in determining choices relating to decentralization and the use of specific performance
measures.  We also find that interdependencies between subunits influences the extent to
which top management delegate decision rights and their use of aggregated performance
measures.  What is of particular interest is that the type of interdependencies influences the
use of aggregate measures. Our results do not confirm prior literature that top management
                                                          
14 Note that both IMPACT1 and IMPACT2 are significant in Equation 2.
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will be reluctant to use aggregated subunit measures in the presence of interdependencies
(Keating, 1997; Bushman et al., 1995).15  It would appear that if a subunit’s activities are
influenced by the actions of managers in other units, aggregated measures are used to a
greater extent.  We find support that there is a sequence in choices relating to structure and
PMS design.  This is contrary to the theoretical predictions of both Milgrom and Roberts
(1995) and Jensen and Meckling (1992) and the empirical evidence provided by Nagar
(1999a).  However, our results are similar to Nagar (1999b) and others (Abernethy and Lillis,
2000) who demonstrate that the relation between organization structural decisions and
performance measure choice is likely to be unidirectional.
There are a number of caveats that should be recognized when considering the
evidence presented in this paper.  First, is the simplicity of the model.  While we have
extended prior research, we examine only two dimensions of organizational design.  There are
numerous other elements of organizational design.  Second, is the potential for measurement
error.  Survey data are only able to capture the perceptions of respondents and thus may be
subject to bias.  However, there is no reason to believe that survey data contains greater
measurement error than archival data where data manipulation and record keeping errors also
create the potential for measurement error.  Third, is the potential for omitted variable bias.
While we control for a number of variables likely to influence this bias there is no doubt
others.
Despite these limitations, this study has the potential to contribute to our
understanding of organizational design, particularly the factors that influence top
management’s choice of performance measures.  Of particular interest are the findings in
relation to the use of specific performance measures and the importance of these measures vis
a vis the use of traditional aggregated profit measures that has dominated much of the
                                                          
15 The OLS results relating to IMPACT1 is consistent with the Keating (1997) result.
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research in the management accounting literature. Further research designed to empirically
assess complementarities among elements of a firm’s control system would contribute
significantly to our understanding of the economics of organizational design choices.



































Summary statistics for decentralization (DECEN), use of own-level aggregated
performance measures (AGG), use of specific measures (SPEC), specific knowledge
(SK), operating interdependencies (SUPPLY), growth opportunities (GROWTH), size of
the unit (SIZE), past performance (PPERF), impact of unit on performance of other units
in firm (IMPACT1), impact of other units in firm on performance of own unit
(IMPACT2), relative size of unit in firm (RSIZE), degree of competition (COMP),
intensity of own-level aggregated measures (INT_AGG), intensity of specific measures
(INT_SPEC), experience and current performance (CPERF). Sample consists of 78
business units. Data obtained from survey of unit managers.
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Median Minimum Maximum
DECEN 5.22 1.05 5.4 2.4 7
AGG 57.28 24.63 50 0 100
SPEC 30.27 21.04 30 0 80
SK 32.82 5.83 33.5 19 42
SUPPLY 32.88 39.15 15 0 150
IMPACT1 4.29 1.87 4 1 7
IMPACT2 4.15 1.85 4 1 7
GROWTH 11.12 1.59 11 8 14
SIZE 5.01 2.26 5 1 8
RSIZE 27.26 20.18 20 1 80
CPERF 9.65 2.14 10 5 14
PPERF 8.94 2.69 9 2 14
INT_AGG 57.78 25.20 52.5 0 100
INT_SPEC 25.09 21.48 20 0 100
COMP 20.28 4.10 21 4 28
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Table 3
Results of principal factor and maximum likelihood factor analysis of responses of 78 subunit managers to
survey questions about the level of specific knowledge (SK), the level of decentralization (DECEN),
competition, growth opportunities (GROWTH), past performance (PPERF) and current performance
(CPERF). Reported are factor loadings (standardized regression coefficients) and communality estimates
(the variance in the observed variable accounted for by the common factor).
Variable Factor loading Communality Estimate (h2)
SK Cronbach’s alpha = 0.86
Maximum likelihood solution tests:
H1 (1 common factor) versus H0 (no common factors),
χ2=202.056, p = 0.00








DECEN Cronbach’s alpha = 0.73
Maximum likelihood solution tests:
H1 (1 common factor) versus H0 (no common factors), χ2=71.87, p
= 0.00







COMP Cronbach’s alpha = 0.64
Maximum likelihood solution tests:
H1 (1 common factor) versus H0 (no common factors), χ2=43.39, p
= 0.00






GROWTH Cronbach’s alpha = 0.74
PPERF Cronbach’s alpha = 0.65
CPERF Cronbach’s alpha = 0.58
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Table 4
Pearson (Spearman) correlations below (above) diagonal between (i) own-level aggregated performance measures (AGG), (ii) specific performance measures
(SPEC), (iii) level of decentralization (DECEN), (iv) specific knowledge (SK), (v) interdependence between units (SUPPLY), (vi) impact of a manager’s
action on other units in a firm (IMPACT1), (vii) impact of other unit managers’ action on own performance (IMPACT2), (viii) growth opportunities
(GROWTH), (ix) current performance (CPERF), (x) size of the unit (SIZE), (xi) relative size of the unit in the firm (RSIZE), (xii) past performance (PPERF),
(xiii) intensity of own level aggregated measures (INT_AGG), (xiv) intensity of specific measures (INT_SPEC) and (xv) degree of competition (COMP).
Correlations are based on 78 observations. (Prob[ρ=0|r] in parenthesis).








































































































































































































































































































































































































































Two stage least squares estimation of the relation between the degree of decentralization (DECEN), the use of own-level aggregated
performance measures (AGG) and the use of specific measures (SPEC) and (i) specific knowledge (SK), (ii) interdependence between units
(SUPPLY), (iii) growth opportunities (GROWTH), (iv) size of a unit (SIZE), (v) past performance (PPERF), (vi) impact of the actions of
unit on the performance of other units (IMPACT1), (vii) impact of the actions of other managers on the performance of own unit
(IMPACT2), (viii) relative size of unit in firm (RSIZE), (ix) the degree of competition (COMP), (x) the current performance (CPERF), (xi)
the intensity of own-level aggregated measures (INT_AGG) and (xii) the intensity of specific measures (INT_SPEC). The suffix _P denotes
predicted values from first-stage regression.
 Based on 78 observations. Standard errors in parenthesis. Coefficient estimates and standard errors are based on a bootstrapping procedure
with 2000 replications. Industry dummies are included but not reported. Significance is based on the empirical distribution of the parameter
estimates. *, **, *** denotes 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels (two-tailed) respectively.
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F-statistic 6.366 2.024 1.871
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Table 6.
Ordinary least squares estimation of the relation between the degree of decentralization (DECEN), the use of
own-level aggregated performance measures (AGG) and the use of specific measures (SPEC) and (i) specific
knowledge (SK), (ii) interdependence between units (SUPPLY), (iii) growth opportunities (GROWTH), (iv)
size of a unit (SIZE), (v) past performance (PPERF), (vi) impact of the actions of unit on the performance of
other units (IMPACT1), (vii) impact of the actions of other managers on the performance of own unit
(IMPACT2), (viii) relative size of unit in firm (RSIZE), (ix) the degree of competition (COMP), (x) the current
performance (CPERF), (xi) the intensity of own-level aggregated measures (INT_AGG) and (xii) the intensity
of specific measures (INT_SPEC):
 Based on 78 observations. Standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** denotes 10%, 5% and 1% significance
levels (two-tailed) respectively. Industry dummies are included but not reported.

























































NOBS 78 78 78
ADJ. R2 53.80% 16.57% 17.44%
F-statistic 9.150 2.390 2.356
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In this section we would like you to compare your influence with the influence of your superior on the
following decisions.
i. Strategic decisions (e.g., development of new products; enter and develop new markets; your unit’s strategy).
ii. Investment decisions (e.g., acquiring new assets and financing investment projects;  information systems)
iii. Marketing decisions (e.g., campaigns; pricing decisions)
iv. Decisions regarding internal processes (setting production/sales priorities; inputs used and/or processes
employed to fill orders; contracting input suppliers).
v. Human resources decisions (e.g., hiring/firing; compensation and setting career paths for the personnel
employed within your unit; reorganizing your unit; creation of new jobs)
If you and/or any of your subordinates make the decision without the knowledge of your supervisor, you and/or













(i) Strategic decisions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 n/o
(ii) Investment decisions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 n/o
(iii) Marketing decisions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 n/o
(iv) Decisions regarding internal
Processes
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 n/o
(v) Human resource decisions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 n/o
2. Aggregated performance measures (AGG)
Indicate the weights your supervisor assigns to each of these measures to assess your unit’s
performance. We would like you to indicate these weights for each of these measures. Your
answers should total 100%.
i. Stock-price related measures %
ii. Firm-level performance measures (e.g., firm output, firm ROI, firm profit margins, firm
income) %
iii. Measures summarizing the total performance of your unit (e.g., your unit’s income, unit EVA
or ROI, unit output) %
Iv. Measures that provide performance information on specific aspects within your business unit
(e.g., R&D, production efficiency or quality programs, unit product costs) %
v. Other measures not mentioned (please specify)…………………………………. %
Total 100%
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3. Specific performance measures (SPEC)
Indicate the weights your supervisor (implicitly or explicitly) assigns to each of these measures to
assess your unit’s performance. We would like you to indicate these weights for each of these
measures. Your answers should total 100%.
i. Stock-price related measures %
ii. Profitability measures (e.g., ROI, profit margins, income) %
iii. Cost measures (e.g., production cost measures, R&D cost) %
iv. Revenue measures %
v. Non-financial performance information on strategy, marketing and investments (e.g., customer
satisfaction, market share, R&D progress) %
vi. Non-financial performance measures on internal processes and human resources (e.g.,
productivity, quality or employee training projects) %












(a) To what extent do your unit’s actions impact
on work carried out in other organizational
units of your firm (IMPACT1).
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 n/o
(b) To what extent do actions of managers of
other units of the firm impact work carried out
in your  particular unit(IMPACT2).
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 n/o
(c) What percentage of your total production is delivered to other organizational units of your firm? %
(d) What percentage of your total production uses inputs acquired from other organizational units of your firm %
5. Growth
(a) What is your expectation with respect to the
growth opportunities that exist within the
industry in which you compete?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 n/o
(b) What is your expectation with respect to the
growth opportunities your specific unit faces?










(a) How intensive is the price competition your
unit faces?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 n/o
(b) How intensive is the competition in promotion
and distribution (marketing) your unit faces?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 n/o
(c) How intensive is the competition in product
quality your unit faces?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 n/o
(d) How intensive is the competition in product
variety your unit faces











(a) How well does your unit perform compared to
the performance of similar units in competing
firms?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 n/o
(b) How well did your unit perform last year
compared to other units or similar units in
competing firms?










(c) How well does your unit perform compared to
what is expected by your superior?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 n/o
(d) How well did your unit perform last year
compared to what was expected by your
superior?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 n/o
8. Performance measurement system intensity.
(e) Please indicate the extent to which the following performance measures reveal the performance of your unit
accurately. In this context, accurateness means that your unit’s effort is well reflected in the performance
measure. We would like you to compare the accurateness of the measures below. If the performance measures
are all equally accurate in your unit, each measure (i – v) receives 20%. If one measure is more accurate, it will
receive a weight of more than 20%. Hence, your answers should total 100%
i. Stock-price related measures %
ii. Measures jointly summarizing the performance of your and other units (e.g., firm wide profit) %
iii. Measures summarizing the total performance of your unit (i.e., your unit’s income, total output
of your unit) %
iv. Measures that provide performance information on specific aspects within your organizational
unit  (e.g., R&D, production efficiency or quality programs) %




Two stage least squares estimation of the relation between the degree of decentralization (DECEN), the use of own-level aggregated
performance measures (AGG) and the use of specific measures (SPEC) and (i) specific knowledge (SK), (ii) interdependence between units
(SUPPLY), (iii) growth opportunities (GROWTH), (iv) size of a unit (SIZE), (v) past performance (PPERF), (vi) impact of the actions of
unit on the performance of other units (IMPACT1), (vii) impact of the actions of other managers on the performance of own unit
(IMPACT2), (viii) relative size of unit in firm (RSIZE), (ix) the degree of competition (COMP), (x) the current performance (CPERF), (xi)
the intensity of own-level aggregated measures (INT_AGG) and (xii) the intensity of specific measures (INT_SPEC). The suffix _P denotes
predicted values from first-stage regression.
 Based on 78 observations. Standard errors in parenthesis. Industry dummies are included but not reported. Significance is based on the
empirical distribution of the parameter estimates. *, **, *** denotes 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels (two-tailed) respectively.

























































NOBS 78 78 78
ADJ. R2 43.39% 12.76% 11.96%
F-statistic 6.366 2.024 1.871
Prob(F) 0.0001 0.0397 0.0548
( ) _ _







1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8




( 3 )  
0D E C E N A G G P S P E C P S K S U P P L Y G R O W T H
S I Z E P P E R F C O M P
A G G D E C E N P S P E C P S K I M P A C T I M P A C T
R S I Z E I N T A G G C O M P
S P E C D E C E N P A G G P S K I M P A C T I M P A C T
C O M P C P E R F I N T S P E C
i i i i i i
i i i i
D E C E N
i i i i i i
i i i i
A G G
i i i i i i
i i i
= + + + + + +
+ + +
= + + + + + +
+ + +
= + + + + + +
+ +
α α α α α α
α α α ε
β β β β β β
β β β ε
γ γ γ γ γ γ
γ γ γ + +γ ε9 R S I Z E i
S P E C
36
